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WRONGFUL DISCHARGE AND THE
NORTH CAROLINA EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
PRACTICES ACT:
THE LOCALIZATION OF FEDERAL
DISCRIMINATION LAW
ANDREW

B.

COHEN*

In 1989, when the North Carolina Supreme Court first explicitly
recognized the tort of wrongful discharge in Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co.,' Justice Meyer complained in his dissent that "the majority has outraced even the California court" in the development of
exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.2 In the five years since
Coman, North Carolina has indeed sprinted ahead of other states in
increasing the availability of wrongful discharge remedies for employees claiming termination of their employment in violation of public
policy. What began as a narrow erosion of the employment-at-will
doctrine 3 is on the verge of becoming part of virtually every lawsuit
arising out of termination of employment4 or refusal to hire.5
One of the principal vehicles responsible for the increased importance of the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy has
been the North Carolina Equal Employment Practices Act [hereinafter EEPA], 6 which declares it a public policy "to protect and safeguard
the right and opportunity of all persons to seek, obtain and hold employment without discrimination or abridgement on account of race,
religion, color, national origin, age, sex or handicap.... "7 The EEPA,
* Andrew B. Cohen is an attorney practicing labor and employment law with Moore &
Van Allen in Durham, North Carolina. Mr. Cohen received a B.A. from Dartmouth College in
1985 and a J.D. from Yale Law School in 1989.
1. 325 N.C. 172, 381 S.E.2d 445 (1989).
2. Id. at 186, 381 S.E.2d at 453 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
3. Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 210, 388 S.E.2d 134, 137 (1990)
("This doctrine has recently been narrowly eroded by statutory and public policy limitations on
its scope.").
4. See, e.g., Percell v. International Business Machines, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 297, 300
(E.D.N.C. 1991).
5. See, e.g., Bass v. City of Wilson, 835 F. Supp. 255 (E.D.N.C. 1993) (allowing a pendent
state claim to proceed under a theory of wrongful refusal to hire in violation of North Carolina's
public policy against age discrimination).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-422.1 to 422.3 (1993).
7. Article 49A of the North Carolina General Statutes states in full:
§ 143-422.1. SHORT TrrLE.
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a substantive policy declaration with no apparent remedy, works in
conjunction with the tort theory of wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy, a remedial mechanism with no defined substantive standards, to furnish a state common law remedy for what had previously
been the exclusive province of federal statutory law.8
This article will explore how the EEPA has been transformed from
a toothless legislative compromise into an apparently limitless source
of employment discrimination claims. Section I of this article will set
out the history of the public policy exception to the doctrine of employment-at-will in North Carolina. Section II will discuss the cases in
North Carolina that have relied upon the legislative declaration in the
EEPA as a basis for holding an action taken by an employer in violation of public policy. Section III will examine the underlying purpose
of the EEPA by reviewing the legislative history of the Act. Section
IV will present an argument against allowing claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy where alternative remedies are
available to uphold the public policy at issue and where the legislature, in declaring the public policy, did not intend to create additional
remedies beyond those previously in existence.
I.
North Carolina has long followed the doctrine of employment-atwill.9 Until the last decade, the doctrine was applied virtually without
exception. The doctrine permits an employment relationship to be
This Article shall be known and may be cited as the Equal Employment Practices Act.
§ 143-422.2. LEGISLATIVE DECLARATI7ON.

It is the public policy of this State to protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all
persons to seek, obtain and hold employment without discrimination or abridgement on
account of race, religion, color, national origin, age, sex or handicap by employers which
regularly employ 15 or more employees.
It is recognized that the practice of denying employment opportunity and discriminating in
the terms of employment foments domestic strife and unrest, deprives the State of the fullest utilization of its capacities for advancement and development, and substantially and adversely affects the interests of employees, employers, and the public in general.
§ 143-422.3. INVESTIGATIONS; CONCILIATIONS.
The Human Relations Commission in the Department of Administration shall have the
authority to receive charges of discrimination from the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission pursuant to an agreement under Section 709(b) of Public Law 88-35, as
amended by Public Law 92-261, and investigate and conciliate charges of discrimination.
Throughout this process, the agency shall use its good offices to effect an amicable resolution of the charges of discrimination.
8. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-633(a) (1989)
[hereinafter ADEA]; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 702, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (1988) [hereinafter Title VII]; Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12117 (Supp. 11 1991) [hereinafter ADA].
9. See, e.g., Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272, disc. rev.
denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978); Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 289 N.C. 71, 221 S.E.2d
282 (1976); Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971); Tuttle v. Kernersville Lumber Co.,
263 N.C. 216, 139 S.E.2d 249 (1964); Malever v. Kay Jewelry Co., 223 N.C. 148, 25 S.E.2d 436
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terminated without cause at the will of either the employer or the
employee.' 0
The North Carolina Court of Appeals took the first step toward the
establishment of a public policy exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine in Sides v. Duke Hospital" by allowing the plaintiff, Marie
Sides, to maintain a lawsuit alleging that she had been discharged
from her nursing position for refusing to commit perjury in a malpractice action against the hospital. The court held that "the words 'at
will' can never mean 'without limit or qualification'... for... the
rights of each person are necessarily and inherently limited by the
rights of others and the interests of the public."' 2 The court explained
further that
while there may be a right to terminate a contract at will for no reason, or for an arbitrary or irrational reason, there can be no right to
terminate such a contract for an unlawful reason or purpose that contravenes public policy. A different interpretation would encourage
and sanction lawlessness,13 which law by its very nature is designed to
discourage and prevent.
While Sides was a striking departure from earlier decisions," over
the next four years, courts remained reluctant to expand the holding
beyond the strict facts of the case. In Walker v. Westinghouse Electric
(1943). See generally J.Wilson Parker, The Uses of the Past: The SurprisingHistory of Terminable-At-Will Employment in North Carolina, 22 WArE FoREsr L. REV. 167 (1987).
10. Prior to 1985, courts in North Carolina had only allowed suits for wrongful discharge in
cases where there had been a promise of employment for a definite duration supported by some
additional consideration. See, e.g., Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 259, 182 S.E.2d 403, 406 (1976);
Tlttle v. Kernersville Lumber Co., 263 N.C. 216, 219, 139 S.E.2d 249, 251 (1964).
11. 74 N.C. App. 331, 328 S.E.2d 818, disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 331, 335 S.E.2d 13 (1985).
See also Susan K. Datesman, Note, Sides v. Duke Hospital: A Public Policy Exception to the
Employment-at-Will Rule, 64 N.C.L. REV. 840 (1986); Arthur S.Leonard, A New Common Law
of Employment Termination, 66 N.C.L. REV. 631 (1988).
12. Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 342, 328 S.E.2d at 826.
13. Id. The Sides court allowed the plaintiff's claim to proceed as well on the alternative
grounds that her employment was not terminable at will since her move to North Carolina from
Michigan in order to accept the job offer constituted additibnal consideration and "was sufficient
.. to remove plaintiff's employment contract from the terminable-at-will rule and allow her to
state a claim for breach of contract .. " Id., 74 N.C. App. at 345, 328 S.E.2d at 828. This article
addresses only the exception to the terminable at will doctrine for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and does not address cases where the employment relationship was made
terminable only for cause by the furnishing of additional consideration, as in the alternative
holding in Sides, or by a statement in an employee handbook. See, e.g., Harris v. Duke Power
Co., 319 N.C. 627, 356 S.E.2d 357 (1987). Also beyond the scope of this article is the debate over
whether North Carolina should recognize a "bad faith" exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine. Compare Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 325 N.C. 172, 176, 381 S.E.2d 445, 448 (1989)
("This Court has never held that an employee at will could be discharged in bad faith.") with
Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., 331 N.C. 348, 360, 416 S.E.2d 166, 173 (1992)("[O]ur discussion
of bad faith discharge in Coman was dicta.... We did not recognize a separate claim for wrongful discharge in bad faith.").
14. See, e.g., Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272, disc. rev.
denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978) (The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that an

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1995

3

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 [1995], Art. 5

19951

WRONGFUL DISCHARGE

Corp.,15 for example, the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed
the entry of summary judgment against an employee who allegedly
had been discharged for expressing concerns about workplace safety.
The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that his discharge fit within
the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine created
in Sides, reasoning that Mr. Walker, unlike Ms. Sides, had not been
asked to violate a law.' 6 The court held that a wrongful discharge
claim could be maintained only upon a showing of a "clear violation
of express public policy."' 7 While recognizing workplace safety as a
major public issue, the court deferred to statutory protections for
workers, stating that "[tihe legislature has worked to strike the proper
balance between the employer's right to design and operate the workplace and the employee's
right to work there free of threats to his or
18
her life and health.'
In Trought v. Richardson,'9 the plaintiff alleged inter alia that she
was discharged for following the Nursing Practice Act2" and hospital
policy in transferring two nurses from the emergency room. The
plaintiff argued that her discharge for following state law was analogous to the situation in Sides, where Ms. Sides alleged that she had
been discharged for refusing to commit perjury.21 In affirming dismissal of this claim, the court stated, without explanation, "[W]e do not
believe this allegation is sufficient to come within or enlarge the exception created by Sides."22
The North Carolina Court of Appeals declined the plaintiffs' request to recognize a broad public policy exception to the employmentat-will doctrine in Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club.23 The plaintiffs in
Hogan claimed to have been discharged in retaliation for lodging
complaints about sexual and verbal harassment and for exercising
medical leave rights. In affirming the dismissal of the plaintiffs'
wrongful discharge claims, the court restricted the availability of the
public policy exception to situations where an individual faced a
choice between violating the law and retaining her job.24
employee at will in North Carolina had no enforceable claim against his employer for discharge
in retaliation for his pursuit of worker's compensation benefits.).
15.
(1986).
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

77 N.C. App. 253, 335 S.E.2d 79 (1985), disc. rev. denied, 315 N.C. 597, 341 S.E.2d 39
Id. at 263, 335 S.E.2d at 86.
Id.
Id.
78 N.C. App. 758, 338 S.E.2d 617 (1986).
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-171.19 to 171.47 (1981).
Trought, 78 N.C. App. at 762, 338 S.E.2d at 619.

22. Id.
23. 79 N.C. App. 483, 340 S.E.2d 116, disc. rev. denied, 317 N.C. 334, 346 S.E.2d 140 (1986).
24. Id. at 500, 340 S.E.2d at 126.
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Similarly, in Burrow v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,25 the North
Carolina Court of Appeals narrowly interpreted the Sides exception
to allow wrongful discharge actions only upon the employer's willful
violation of a clearly expressed public policy. 26 The court rejected the
plaintiff's public policy claim based on his alleged discharge for refusing to operate his tractor-trailer when a disability in his leg prevented
him from driving safely. A rule of law recognizing "that every discharge for failure to perform an allegedly unsafe task is actionable,"
the court reasoned, "would create
a prolific and unwarranted source
27
of trouble in the workplace.
Federal courts applying North Carolina law interpreted the Sides
exception narrowly as well. In Guy v. Travenol Laboratories,Inc.,28
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a former supervisor at a
drug manufacturing plant did not state a claim for wrongful discharge
by alleging that he was discharged for refusing to falsify records required by the United States Food and Drug Administration. z9 In
Rupinsky v. Miller Brewing Co.,30 the United States District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania, applying North Carolina law,
refused to recognize a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy despite the plaintiff's argument that his discharge
was designed to deter union organizing.
During the four years following the North Carolina Court of Appeals' Sides opinion, the only published decision allowing a wrongful
discharge claim to proceed in North Carolina involved facts similar to
those at issue in Sides: discharge for refusal to commit perjury. In
Williams v. Hillhaven Corp.," the North Carolina Court of Appeals
held that the Sides public policy exception applied to the plaintiff's
claim that she was discharged because she testified under subpoena at
an unemployment compensation hearing on behalf of a nurse assistant
who had been fired by the same employer. Although the plaintiff in
Williams, unlike Ms. Sides, did not allege that she had been encouraged to commit perjury in advance of her testimony, the court
pointed to the fact that both were discharged from employment for
25. 88 N.C. App. 347, 363 S.E.2d 215 (1988), disc. rev. denied, 322 N.C. 111, 367 S.E.2d 910
(1988).
26. Id. at 354, 363 S.E.2d at 219.
27. Id., 363 S.E.2d at 219-20.
28. 812 F.2d 911 (4th Cir. 1987).
29. See also J. Michael McGuinness, The Doctrineof Wrongful Dischargein North Carolina:
The Confusing Path from Sides to Guy and the Need for Reform, 10 CAMPBELL L. REV. 217
(1988).
30. 627 F. Supp. 1181 (W.D. Pa. 1986).
31. 91 N.C. App. 35, 370 S.E.2d 423 (1988).
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telling the truth, thus placing the Williams case "into the same narrow
exception ... that Sides created." 32
In 1989, in Coman v. Thomas ManufacturingCo. ,33 the North Carolina Supreme Court for the first time endorsed the public policy exception to the doctrine of employment-at-will. The plaintiff alledged
that he had been discharged from his job as a truck driver for refusing
to drive for more than ten hours per day and refusing to falsify his
driving logs, both violations of federal transportation regulations. The
court observed that the employer's alleged conduct also violated the
public policy of North Carolina as set forth in the North Carolina Administrative Code,34 which provided that the rules and regulations
adopted by the federal Department of Transportation also applied to
the highways of North Carolina.3 5
The Coman court explicitly approved and adopted the language
from Sides stating that there is no right to terminate an employmentat-will contract for an unlawful reason or purpose that contravenes
public policy.3 6 In finding that the plaintiff had stated a claim for
wrongful discharge in violation of the public policy of promoting highway safety, the court explained that the "plaintiff allegedly was faced
with the dilemma of violating that public policy and risking imprisonment,... or complying
with the public policy and being fired from his
37
employment.
With the North Carolina Supreme Court's explicit recognition of
the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine in
Coman, the principal battlefield in wrongful discharge litigation
shifted to the issue of specific acts that would constitute a violation of
public policy sufficient to trigger the Sides/Coman exception. Because
the parameters of "public policy" for the purposes of this exception
had not been clearly set forth in the North Carolina Supreme Court's
32. Id. at 39, 370 S.E.2d at 425.
33. 325 N.C. 172, 381 S.E.2d 445 (1989). See also Duncan Alford, Note, Coman v. Thomas
Manufacturing Co.: Recognizing a Public Policy Exception to the At-Will Employment Doctrine,
68 N.C. L. REV. 1178 (1990).
34. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 19A, r. 3D.0801 (1988).

35. Coman, 325 N.C. at 176, 381 S.E.2d at 447. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-384 provides that the
North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles may promulgate highway safety rules and regulations
for interstate motor carriers in North Carolina, which it did by adopting by reference the federal
regulations. 19A N.C. A.O.C. 3D.0801 (1983). Further, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-397 establishes
criminal penalties for seeking to evade or defeat such regulations.
36. Coman, 325 N.C. at 175, 381 S.E.2d at 447 (citing, Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 342, 328 S.E.2d

at 826). The court recognized that the perjury and subornation of perjury at issue in Sides differed from the operation of a truck in violation of federal law and the falsifying of federal
records at issue in Coman, but held that "both offend the public policy of North Carolina." Id.
37. Coman, 325 N.C. at 176, 381 S.E.2d at 447.
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Coman opinion,38 the issue was left open to interpretation and expansion in subsequent judicial opinions.
The plaintiffs' bar in North Carolina seized the opportunity created
by Coman to increase the number of wrongful discharge claims
brought by employees who had arguably been discharged in violation
of an established public policy, resulting in a number of federal court
decisions which expanded the public policy exception. Thus, in Harrison v. Edison Brothers Apparel Stores, Inc.,39 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in
dismissing a wrongful discharge claim brought by a woman who alleged that she was fired after refusing a supervisor's request for sex.
While the court noted that "the only three successful wrongful discharge plaintiffs ... in reported North Carolina cases have had to

choose between their jobs and violating the criminal law,"4 the plaintiff's claim was allowed to go forward because the supervisor's alleged
demand for sex in exchange for job security was held to violate North
Carolina's law prohibiting prostitution.41 Extending the Coman decision even further, Judge Erwin of the United States District Court for
the Middle District of North Carolina held in Riley v. Dow Coming
Corp.42 that a plaintiff's assertion that he was fired for doing something that he was instructed to do, and was therefore "set up" for firing, stated a valid Coman claim.
Nevertheless, other federal court decisions continued to interpret
the public policy exception narrowly. In Strickland v. MICA Information Systems," 3 Judge Tilley of the Middle District dismissed a wrongful discharge claim brought by a plaintiff claiming to have been
discharged in retaliation for filing a wage and hour complaint with the
Department of Labor. The court based its decision upon the Fourth
Circuit's holding in Harrison that the public policy exception applies
only to situations where an employee's continued employment is conditioned upon the violation of a criminal law or regulation."
The first post-Coman North Carolina state court opinion to address
the public policy exception was McLaughlin v. Barclays American
38. "Public policy" in Coman was defined as "the principle of law which holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public
good." Coman, 325 N.C. at 175, 381 S.E.2d at 447 n.2, citing Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. App. 1959)).

39. 924 F.2d 530 (4th Cir. 1991). See infra text accompanying notes 69-70 for discussion of
the district court's opinion in Harrison.
40. Id. at 533 (the court was referring to Sides, Williams, and Coman).
41. Id. at 533 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-203 which prohibits "the offering or receiving of
the body for sexual intercourse for hire.").
42. 767 F. Supp. 735 (M.D.N.C. 1991).
43. 800 F. Supp. 1320 (M.D.N.C. 1992).
44. Id at 1326 (citing Harrison,924 F.2d at 533).
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Corp., in which the North Carolina Court of Appeals began its discussion by noting that " '[p]ublic policy' is a 'vague expression.' "46 In

McLaughlin, plaintiff asserted a public policy favoring an "employee's
use of self-defense" after he had been discharged following an altercation with another employee.47 The court narrowly interpreted the
public policy exception in affirming the entry of summary judgment
against the plaintiff. The court stated that it did "not read the
[Coman] decision as being broad enough to support the exception Mr.
McLaughlin would have [it] announce."'4 The facts of the case were
held to be "not of sufficient moment" to justify spawning the deluge of
wrongful termination suits that would result from allowing a potential
claim for every employee involved in an altercation.49
The North Carolina Court of Appeals next addressed the issue in
Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co.50 The case involved three former employees of Oakdale Knitting Company who learned in February, 1988
that their pay had been effectively reduced to $2.18 per hour, below
the statutory minimum wage of $3.35 per hour. When they asked why
their pay had been reduced below the minimum wage, they were told
by one of the owners of the company that they could either accept the
lower wages or be fired. The three employees refused to work under
these conditions, and were discharged. They sued for wrongful discharge, seeking lost wages, special damages for emotional distress,
and punitive damages. The court of appeals upheld the superior
court's ruling that the plaintiffs were not entitled to sue for wrongful
discharge, since the State Wage and Hour Act allowed them to continue working and pursue a statutory remedy for back pay. The court
reasoned that "[r]elegating an employee to his statutory remedy is...
a sound policy where ...the employee has not been required to en-

gage in unlawful conduct and the employer's statutory violation does
not threaten the public safety."'"
On direct appeal, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that the availability of an alternative state or federal
statutory remedy does not preclude a wrongful discharge claim under
45. 95 N.C. App. 301, 382 S.E.2d 836, cert. denied, 325 N.C. 546, 385 S.E.2d 498 (1989).

46. Id. at 305, 382 S.E.2d at 839.
47. Id. at 304, 382 S.E.2d at 838-39.
48. Id. at 307, 382 S.E.2d at 840.

49. Id.
50. 102 N.C. App. 782,403 S.E.2d 565 (1991), reversed, 331 N.C. 348, 416 S.E.2d 166 (1992).
The North Carolina Supreme Court's reversal of the court of appeals' decision in Amos laid the
legal groundwork for the use of the North Carolina Equal Employment Practices Act as a basis

for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claims, notwithstanding the availability of
statutory remedies under federal discrimination laws. See infra text accompanying notes 56-60.
51. Id. at 786, 403 S.E.2d at 568.
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the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. 52 The
court framed the issue before it to be "whether Coman is limited to
situations in which the fired employee has no other available remedy."5 3 In holding that "[t]he existence of other remedies.., does not
render the public policy exception moot," the court explained that the
public policy exception recognized in Coman was not meant to be
merely a "remedial gap-filler."'54 Rather, the court described the exception as "a judicially recognized outer limit to a judicially created
doctrine, designed to vindicate the rights of employees fired for rea'55
sons offensive to the public policy of this State.
The court explained that the existence of an alternative remedy
would only preclude a claim for wrongful discharge where federal legislation preempts state law under the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution 56 or where the state legislature has expressed its
intent to supplant the common law with exclusive statutory remedies.5 7 The issue of federal preemption was not squarely addressed by
the supreme court in Amos since it had not been raised in the lower
courts. 58 The court could find no intent by the state legislature to supplant the common law of wrongful discharge with exclusive statutory
remedies, due to the absence of any express or implied statement precluding a common law action and the fact that the statutory declaration of public policy in the Wage and Hour Act predated the existence
of the common law wrongful discharge claim.5 9
In Amos, the supreme court laid the groundwork for allowing alleged victims of employment discrimination to proceed simultaneously under federal statutory theories and state common law wrongful
discharge theories. Amos seemingly provides a parallel state tort action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy to virtually
every plaintiff with a state or federal statutory claim arising out of a
discharge from employment.
The impact of Amos was felt almost immediately with the release
two weeks later of an order in Battle v. Perdue Foods, Inc.6" by Judge
Boyle of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
52. Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., 331 N.C. 348, 416 S.E.2d 166 (1992). While refusing to
offer a precise definition of the term "public policy" as applied to the exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, the court stated that "at the very least public policy is violated when an
employee is fired in contravention of expressed policy declarations contained in the North Carolina General Statutes." Id., 331 N.C. at 353, 416 S.E.2d at 169.
53. Id. at 355, 416 S.E.2d at 170.
54. Id. at 356, 416 S.E.2d at 171.
55. Id.
56. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
57. Amos, 331 N.C. at 356, 416 S.E.2d at 171.
58. Id. at 357, 416 S.E.2d at 172.
59. Id. See also infra discussion of state law preclusion at text accompanying notes 126-128.
60. No. 91-68-CIV-2-BO, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13769 (E.D.N.C. May 28, 1992).
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North Carolina. In Battle, the court held that a woman who had been
discharged for falling asleep during her shift after taking pain medication for tendonitis could maintain an action for wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy,6 ' based on the public policy expressed in the
North Carolina Handicapped Persons Protection Act. 62 This ruling
came despite the fact that the plaintiff had missed the claims filing
deadline set by the state legislature in the statute which established
the public policy against handicap discrimination.63
Under Amos, the existence of alternative remedies to vindicate the
rights of discharged employees will not generally bar plaintiffs from
pursuing wrongful discharge claims, either alone or in conjunction
with available statutory claims. As discussed below, federal courts in
North Carolina have interpreted the holding of Amos to mean that
claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy may be
based upon the public policy articulated in the EEPA,1 notwithstanding the legislature's decision in enacting that statute that employment
should proceed under the
discrimination litigation in North Carolina
65
existing federal statutory framework.
II.
Due to the breadth of the public policy declaration contained in the
EEPA,6 the plaintiffs' bar in North Carolina has increasingly found
the statute to be a fertile source of public policy wrongful discharge
claims. The North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Amos was a
watershed opinion for allowing wrongful discharge claims to be based
on the public policy of the EEPA.
Prior to Amos, attempts to use the EEPA as a basis for public policy
wrongful discharge claims met with mixed results. The decisions appeared to vary depending on the particular federal district court judge
assigned to the case,67 at times with conflicting pronouncements coming out of the same judicial district. In Frazierv. First Union National
Bank,68 the first published decision in North Carolina to address this
issue, Judge Potter of the United States District Court for the Western
61. Id. at 7.
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 168A-1 to 23 (1987).
63. Ms. Battle's claim under the Handicapped Persons Protection Act was dismissed because she filed suit two days after the expiration of the 180-day period for filing suit under the
statute. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A-12.

64. See infra Section It.
65. See infra Section III.
66. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-422.2. See supra note 7 for text of this section.
67. All of the published opinions involving claims for wrongful discharge in violation of the
public policy of the Equal Employment Practices Act have come from the courts of the three
federal districts in North Carolina.
68. 747 F. Supp. 1540 (W.D.N.C. 1990).
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District of North Carolina held that a plaintiff who had an adequate
statutory remedy in Title VII should not be permitted to pursue a
public policy wrongful discharge claim based on the public policy em-

bodied in the EEPA. The court cited Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel Stores, Inc.6 9 in stating that "the public policy exception is

limited to circumstances where the plaintiff could establish: (1) that
the discharge violates some well-established public policy; and (2) that
there is no remedy to protect the interest of the aggrieved employee
or society."70 Because Title VII provided plaintiffs with an adequate
remedy, the wrongful discharge claims in Frazierwere dismissed.
In Percell v. InternationalBusiness Machines, Inc.,71 a black employee alleged that his discharge violated the public policy against
race discrimination contained in the EEPA.72 Judge Dupree initially
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the wrongful discharge
claim, based largely on the North Carolina Court of Appeals' decision
in Amos that the public policy exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine should not be extended to afford a cause of action in addition
to that provided by statute.7 3 The court rejected the argument that
allowance of a state common law wrongful discharge claim for discriminatory discharge was compelled by the open courts clause of the
state constitution.7 4 Judge Dupree pointed out that "although the

statutory remedy available to plaintiff is a federal one, plaintiff has
been afforded a state court forum through the state's exercise of concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII claims." 7 5 Moreover, the court

69. 724 F. Supp. 1185, 1193 (M.D.N.C. 1989), rev'd, 924 F.2d 530 (4th Cir. 1991).
70. Frazier,747 F. Supp. at 1553. This test was explicitly rejected by the Fourth Circuit in its
opinion reversing the district court's Harrison decision. Harrison, 924 F.2d at 533 (4th Cir.
1991). The Fourth Circuit found that there was no North Carolina authority for the proposition
that wrongful discharge claims were only available where there was no other remedy to protect
the interest of the employee or society. Id. However, the Fourth Circuit did not base the public
policy wrongful discharge claim on the EEPA, and in fact stated that "[t]here is no North Carolina statute analogous to Title VII." lId, n.2. While the underlying acts of alleged sexual harassment could have been found to be violative of the public policy embodied in Title VII or the
EEPA, the court instead allowed the wrongful discharge claim to proceed based upon the public
policy against prostitution. Id. at 534.
71. 765 F. Supp. 297 (E.D.N.C. 1991).
72. The plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim was pendent to claims under Title VII and 42
U.S.C. § 1981.
73. The district court later reinstated the state wrongful discharge claim. 90-538-CIV-5-D
(E.D.N.C. Dec. 8, 1992). The motion to reconsider the federal discrimination claims under Title
VII was denied. 785 F. Supp. 1229 (1992), aff'd, 23 F.3d 402 (4th Cir. 1994).
74. N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 18 states:
All courts shall be open; every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or
reputation shall have remedy by due course of law; and right and justice shall be administered without favor, denial, or delay.
See also Coman, 325 N.C. at 174, 381 S.E.2d at 445.
75. Percell, 765 F. Supp. at 302 (citing Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820
(1990)). The plaintiff in Percell filed his complaint in state court, though the action was removed
to federal court by the defendant. Id. at 298.
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noted that approval of a public policy wrongful discharge claim based
on the EEPA "would likely result in a pendent state claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy being attached to virtually
every employment discrimination suit filed."7 6
Exactly one week after the release of the Percell decision holding
that the EEPA could not be the basis for a public policy wrongful
discharge claim, Judge Gordon of the Middle District of North
Carolina came to the opposite conclusion in Iturbe v. Wandel &
Goltermann Technologies, Inc. 7 7 The court stated that Amos had established a two-part test for the application of the public policy exception: "(1) the discharge must violate some well-established public
policy, and (2) there must be no North Carolina statutory remedy to
protect the interest of the aggrieved employee or society.""8 Because
the legislature provided no North Carolina statutory remedy for a violation of the public policy articulated in the EEPA, the court held that
a wrongful discharge claim based on the public policy of the act should
be allowed to proceed.79
Approximately two months later, Judge McMillan of the Western
District of North Carolina held in Mayse v. Protective Agency, Inc.,8
that a violation of the EEPA constituted a violation of public policy
sufficient to state a wrongful discharge claim under Coman. The underlying facts involved allegations of racial discrimination and harassment lodged by two black women against their former employer. In
affirming the right of the plaintiffs to proceed under a wrongful discharge theory, Judge McMillan cited both Percell and Iturbe, but
stated that he found the reasoning of Iturbe to be persuasive.8 '
Less than two months after Mayse, Judge Britt of the Eastern District addressed the same issue in Leach v. Northern Telecom, Inc.,82 a
case involving a wrongful discharge claim brought pendent to claims
of sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. The opinion in
Leach also discussed both the Percell and turbe decisions, 3 but
76. Id. at 300.
77. 774 F. Supp. 959 (M.D.N.C. 1991). while the plaintiff's claims survived a motion to
dismiss, the actibn was later dismissed following the granting of the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Iturbe, No. 1:90CV00242 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 28, 1993).
78. Id. at 963 (citing Amos, 102 N.C. App. at 787, 403 S.E.2d at 568). However, Judge
Gordon misstated the test set out in Amos. The court of appeals' Amos decision spoke only
about the need for a remedy to protect the interest of the aggrieved employee or society; there
was no requirement that the remedy be a North Carolina statutory one. Amos, 102 N.C. App. at
787, 403 S.E.2d at 568.
79. Iturbe, 774 F. Supp. at 963.
80. 772 F. Supp. 267 (W.D.N.C. 1991).
81. Id. at 275.
82. 141 F.R.D. 420 (E.D.N.C. 1991).
83. Id. at 426-27.

https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol21/iss1/5

12

Cohen: Wrongful Discharge and the North Carolina Equal Employment Practi

66

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:54

Judge Britt elected to follow the reasoning of Percell and dismissed
the plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim. 84
In Royster v. GKN Automotive, Inc.,85 Judge Ward of the Middle

District dismissed a pendent wrongful discharge claim alleging that a
black employee's discharge violated the public policy of the EEPA.
Citing the 1991 Percelldecision, 86 Judge Ward held that the public policy exception should not be extended to cover such claims. The court
framed the issue not as whether the presence or absence of a North
Carolina remedy for employment discrimination should preclude a
common law wrongful discharge action, but instead as whether the
particular legislative act should serve as a basis for such a claim.
Judge Ward expressed his agreement with the holding of Percell that
"the North Carolina Employment Practices Act does not afford a basis for a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine. '87
Thus, prior to Amos, the federal district courts in Frazier, Percell,
Leach, and Royster 88 had held that the EEPA could not be the basis
for a public policy wrongful discharge claim, while the courts in Iturbe
and Mayse had reached the opposite result. Based on the North Carolina Supreme Court's Amos decision, however, motions to reconsider
were granted in both the Percell and Royster actions. In holding that
the new decision in Amos meant that a wrongful discharge claim could
be based on the public policy of the EEPA despite the availability of
Title VII remedies, Judge Dupree observed in Percell that the North
Carolina Supreme Court had rejected the argument that the availability of an alternative statutory remedy would automatically foreclose a
wrongful discharge claim.8 9 In Royster, Judge Ward reconsidered his
earlier holding that a violation of the public policy of the EEPA could
not give rise to a wrongful discharge claim. Although he expressed
misgivings about the ruling, he felt the result was compelled by
Amos. 90

84. Id.
85. No. 2:91CV00438, slip. op. (M.D.N.C. Aug. 7, 1992), motion to reconsider granted, No.
2:91CV00438 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 18, 1993).
86. 765 F. Supp. at 300-01.
87. Royster, No. 2:91CV00438, slip op. at 4 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 7, 1992).
88. Royster was actually released after the supreme court's Amos decision, but Judge Ward
was apparently unaware of the decision, as it is not cited in his original ruling on the motion to
dismiss in Royster.
89. Percell, No. 90-538-CIV-5-D, slip op. at 4 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 8, 1992).
90. In granting the motion to reconsider, Judge Ward wrote:
The Court takes this action with great reluctance. However, the Court understands that
with regard to issues arising out of pendent state claims in federal court, it is bound by the
legal tenets developed by the North Carolina Supreme Court. The Court does not waiver
from its belief that the North Carolina Supreme Court has essentially created a pendent
state claim for wrongful discharge for virtually every employment discrimination suit filed
under Title VII. Since there cannot be a double recovery, the real issue in federal court will

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1995

13

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 [1995], Art. 5

1995]

WRONGFUL DISCHARGE

Since the supreme court's Amos decision, several other federal
court decisions in North Carolina have held that allegations of violations of the EEPA could be the basis of a claim for wrongful discharge
in violation of public policy: McKinney v. Northern Telecom, Inc.91
(age discrimination); Phillips v.J.P. Stevens & Co.9 (sexual harassment and sex discrimination); and Gower v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co.93 (age discrimination violating the EEPA was not preempted by conflicting remedial provisions of the federal ADEA).
Perhaps the most surprising development in the public policy tort
area was the approval of a claim for "age discrimination in violation of
public policy" brought by a rejected job applicant in Bass v. City of
Wilson.94 The Bass decision, which was written by Magistrate Judge
Denson of the Eastern District, held that the plaintiff was permitted to
maintain a cause of action for "failure to hire in violation of the public
policy articulated in N.C.G.S. § 143-422.1 et seq."95 The defendant
had filed a motion to dismiss the public policy claim, arguing that the
plaintiff was merely a job applicant, not an employee, and thus was
not protected by the EEPA as applied through wrongful discharge actions under Coman and Amos. While acknowledging that no court in
North Carolina had recognized such a claim, Magistrate Judge Denson found that "[i]f it violates public policy to discriminate against an
individual during employment or as a basis for termination, then it is
equally abusive to discriminate against an individual seeking employment."96 The effect of Bass, if upheld and followed by other courts,
will be to transform a once narrow exception to the doctrine of employment-at-will into a doctrine that goes beyond the wrongful discharge context and reaches into the hiring process.
It thus appears, as predicted by Judge Dupree in his 1991 Percell
opinion, that the allowance of wrongful discharge claims based on the
public policy of the EEPA has resulted "in a pendent state claim for
be the state claim. Title VII simply becomes the vehicle by which a plaintiff arrives in
federal court. This should not be so.
Royster, No. 2:91CV00438, slip op. at 2-3 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 18, 1993).
91. No. 1:91CV00426 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 24, 1992) [1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21948].
92. 827 F. Supp. 349 (M.D.N.C. 1993).
93. No. 93-211-CIV-5-F (E.D.N.C. Oct. 28, 1993).
94. 835 F. Supp. 255 (E.D.N.C. 1993).
95. Id. at 258.
96. Id. However, this analysis ignores the fact that discrimination in hiring and termination
are generally treated as distinct matters in employment litigation. Thus under 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
prior to the amendments in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, race discrimination at the hiring or
contract formation stage was actionable, while race discrimination in the termination context
was insufficient to state a Section 1981 claim. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S.
164 (1989); Mojica v. Gannett Co., 779 F. Supp. 94, 98 (E.D. Ill.
1991) (discussing the effect of
the 1991 Civil Rights Act on Patterson).
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wrongful discharge in violation of public policy bein attached to virtually every employment discrimination suit filed."
III.
The surge of wrongful discharge claims based on the public policy
declared in the EEPA has come without any serious examination of
the underlying purpose of the statute. Therefore, in order to address
the issue of the proper use of the EEPA, it seems appropriate as a first
step to study the manner in which the EEPA was enacted.9 8
A review of the legislative history shows that the EEPA as enacted
in 1977 was a watered-down version of a proposed bill which would
have created a state enforcement mechanism to resolve employment
discrimination claims. When the original bill faced strong opposition
in the Senate committee to which it was referred, a compromise was
reached whereby virtually all enforcement power was stripped from
the EEPA, leaving little more than a simple declaration of public
policy.99
The EEPA was introduced in the State House of Representatives by
Representative Michaux as House Bill 810 and in the State Senate by
Senator Sebo as Senate Bill 459 on April 8, 1977.1°° The stated purpose of the bill was "to promote and protect the welfare of the people
of the State of North Carolina by prevention and elimination of discriminatory employment practices and policies based upon race, color,
religion, national origin, ancestry, age, or sex."''1 1 The bill would have
added a new article to Chapter 143 of the North Carolina General
Statutes to prohibit employment discrimination in much the same way
as Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964. The bill called for
the creation of a state administrative agency that would hear and resolve complaints not resolved by conciliation.
The bill, which began with a legislative declaration of public policy
similar to that contained in the enacted version of the EEPA, would
have prohibited discrimination in any aspect of the employment rela97. Percell, 765 F. Supp. at 300.
98. The North Carolina Supreme Court has recently held that the primary task of the courts
in construing a statute is "to ensure that the purpose of the legislature, the legislative intent, is
accomplished." Electric Supply Co. of Durham, Inc. v. Swain Electric Co., Inc., 328 N.C. 651,
656, 403 S.E.2d 291,294 (1991). The court also stated that the legislative history of a state statute
may be examined as a means of discerning the legislature's intent. Id. at 656, 403 S.E.2d at 295.
99. Under Electric Supply v. Swain, "[c]hanges made by the legislature to statutory structure and language are indicative of a change in legislative intent and therefore provide some
weight in our analysis." Id. at 656, 403 S.E.2d at 295.
100. Daily Bulletin (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Institute of Government),
Bulletin No. 63, April 8, 1977, at 515, 524. See S. 459, 1st Sess., 1977 N.C. Gen. Assembly for the
full text of the proposed bill.
101. Id
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tionship on the basis of a person's race, color, religion, national origin,
ancestry, sex, or age. 10 2 Covered employers included the following:
(1) employers having 15 or more employees; (2) labor organizations;
(3) employment agencies; and (4) joint labor-management committees
controlling apprenticeship or other training programs.' 0 3
The bill contained specific exemptions and exceptions which would
have: (1) exempted religious organizations from the prohibition
against religious discrimination for persons hired to perform work related to the organizations' religious activities; (2) allowed discrimination if religion, sex, or national origin was a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to normal business operation; (3)
allowed sectarian schools to establish religious qualifications for employment; (4) allowed seniority or merit systems that measure earnings by quantity or quality of production or location of work place,
notwithstanding a disparate impact on terms and conditions of employment, if such disparate impact was not the result of a prohibited
intention to discriminate; and (5) permitted employment decisions
based on the results of professionally developed and job-validated
tests, if such tests were not designed or used to discriminate on a prohibited basis."°
The proposed bill also would have created an Equal Employment
Practices Division within the State Department of Administration to
serve as a referral agency under Title VII. 05 Complaints of discrimination were to be filed with the director of the division, who would
initially investigate the matter."° If formal action were warranted,
and conciliation was not successful, the director would then bring the
complaint to a five-member Equal Employment Practices Commis102. See S. 459, § 143-416.4. The provisions with respect to discrimination on the basis of age
were to apply only to individuals between the pages of 40 and 65. Id § 143-416.9. Compare
Section 703 of Title VII:
EMPLOYER PRACTICES
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
103. S. 459 §§ 143-416.3 to 416.7.
104. Id §§ 143-416.9 to 416.11.
105. Id. § 143-416.19. Under Title VII, in states with such referral agencies in place, complaints are first filed with the state agency, and proceedings before the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC] are deferred pending state administrative proceedings.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), (d) (1988).
106. S. 459 § 143-416.12.
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sion within the Department of Administration. °7 Members of the
commission were to be chosen by the Governor for staggered six-year
of the five members permitted to be
terms, with no more than three
08
from the same political party.1
Under the enforcement provisions of the bill, complaints alleging
employment discrimination could be filed by the aggrieved person, by
his or her representative, or by the Attorney General. Complaints
were to be filed within 180 days after the alleged discrimination. The
director of the Equal Employment Practices Division would investigate and have 90 days to determine whether reasonable cause existed
to believe that an unlawful practice had occurred. Upon a finding of
reasonable cause, the director would attempt to eliminate the unlawful practice by conciliation or persuasion within 90 days. 10 9 If no reasonable cause was found, or if no conciliation was reached, the
complainant could petition the Equal Employment Practices Commission to have the complaint formally adjudicated in an adversary hearing conducted pursuant to the State Administrative Procedure Act. 10
The commission would have had the power to order additional remedies, including reinstatement, back pay, and attorneys' fees. The commission's orders would have been appealable to or enforceable by the
superior court in the county in which the hearing was conducted.'!'
Also under the proposed bill, a local human relations commission
was to be authorized by the local governing body to process complaints alleging employment discrimination in the same manner as
(and in lieu of) the state commission, at least up to and including the
conciliation stage." 2 However, local commissions were to have no
power to hold adversary hearings, and complainants would have been
required to petition the state commission for a hearing to pursue a
case beyond the voluntary conciliation stage. The original proposed
effective date of the act was January 1, 1978.
The proposed bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary II Committee, where it was discussed at a June 7, 1977 meeting." 3 The bill was
explained by Senator Sebo as a means to "open an avenue through
which to funnel Federal money into the State and thereby ease the
backlog of discriminatory claims.""' 4 However, there was sentiment
in the committee against having the state duplicate functions already
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. § 143-416.13.
Id. § 143-416.19.
Id. § 143-416.12.
N.C. GEN. STAT. Ch. 150A (recodified as §§ 150B-1 to 64, effective January 1, 1986).
S.459 §§ 143-416.15, 143-416.16.

112. Id. § 143-416.17 (N.C. GEN STAT. § 160A-492 authorizes the governing body of any city,
town, or county to establish a human relation commission).
113. Minutes, Senate Committee on Judiciary II (June 7, 1977).
114. Id.
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performed by the federal government. 115 Senator Lawing "felt that
the Federal government should 'beef up' their own program116when
they are behind" rather than having a state program created.
Following further discussion, the committee approved a motion for
an unfavorable report on the original bill and a favorable report on a
committee substitute bill.1" 7 The committee's action essentially gutted
the original bill, leaving only the legislative declaration of public policy" 8 and a provision that the Human Relations Council in the Department of Administration shall have the authority to receive charges
of discrimination from the EEOC and "shall use its good offices to
effect an amicable resolution of the charges of discrimination." 119 All
of the detailed provisions that would have set up a comprehensive
state statutory mechanism for investigation, conciliation, and adjudi20
cation of charges of discrimination were removed from the bill.'
After a minor stylistic amendment,'121 the committee substitute bill
was adopted by the Senate on June 10, 1977122 and sent to the House,
where it was adopted on June 23, 1977.123 The final bill was read and
ratified in the General Assembly on June 24, 1977, and became effective on July 1, 1977.124
IV.
Through the federal courts' application of the North Carolina
Supreme Court's Amos decision, the EEPA has routinely become the
basis for public policy wrongful discharge claims. 25 Courts have generally approached the issue of the viability of such claims from the
standpoint of whether, under Amos, a wrongful discharge claim is
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id
Id.
Id.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-422.2 (1993).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-422.3 (1993).
Compare S. 459, 1st Sess., 1977 N.C. Gen. Assembly (April 7, 1977) with Committee

Substitute for S.459, 1st Sess., 1977 N.C. Gen. Assembly (June 8, 1977). The committee's action
reduced the length of the bill from 25 pages to under two pages.
121. A proposed amendment to strike the "Investigations; conciliations" section of the bill,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-422.3, failed in committee. An amendment to strike the words "that

violate the purposes of this act" from the end of the first sentence of that section passed. See
North Carolina General Assembly Amendments to Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 459,

University of North Carolina Institute of Government.
122. Senate Journal, 1977 Session (June 10, 1977).
123. House Journal, 1977 Session (June 24, 1977). On June 16, 1977, the House Judiciary I
Committee had given a favorable report on the committee substitute for Senate Bill 459 and an
indefinite postponement report for House Bill 810, which was identical to the original proposed
Senate Bill 459. Minutes, House Committee on Judiciary I (June 16, 1977).
124. 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 726, sess. 1. See supra note 7 for full text of EEPA.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 91-97.
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foreclosed by the existence of an exclusive statutory remedy.' 26 Pointing to the holding in Amos that "the existence of an alternative remedy does not automatically preclude a claim for wrongful discharge
based on the public policy exception,"' 127 the federal courts have uniformly ruled that the availability of federal statutory remedies does
not preclude state public policy wrongful discharge claims based on
the EEPA. Thus, the focus of judicial analysis has been on whether a
wrongful discharge claim is precluded by alternative remedies. However, no court has approached the issue from the standpoint of
whether the EEPA is a permissible basis for a public policy wrongful
discharge claim. The legislative history of the EEPA shows that the
legislature sought to channel employment discrimination through the
existing federal statutory framework, and the EEPA should not be
used as a public policy basis upon which wrongful discharge claims can
be brought.
In Sides, the North Carolina Court of Appeals stated that "in the
absence of a declaration to the contrary it should be assumed that the
legislature favors the enforcement of the law by all legitimate and cus128
tomary means, including suits in the civil courts in proper cases.'
While there is no explicit declaration in the EEPA disclaiming an intent to enforce the act through common law wrongful discharge suits,
it appears from the history of the statute's enactment that a legislative
majority was not in favor of expanding the remedies available to aggrieved plaintiffs beyond those afforded by existing federal statutes.
In fact, the original bill, which would have provided state law remedies similar to those which will be available under Amos and current
wrongful discharge decisions, was considered by the state legislature
and rejected in committee.
The North Carolina Supreme Court stated in Burgess v. Your House
of Raleigh, Inc.129 that in determining the scope of the North Carolina
Handicapped Persons Protection Act,'3 0 a statute which prohibits employment discrimination against handicapped persons, the court's "interpretation of [the] act must be responsive to two countervailing
considerations - the desire to give effect to the statutory objectives
and the need to keep the scope of the act within the boundaries intended by the General Assembly.' 3 1 By allowing wrongful discharge
126. See, e.g., Percell,No. 538-CIV-5-D, slip op. at 4 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 8, 1992).
127. Amos, 331 N.C. at 356, 416 S.E.2d at 171.
128. 74 N.C. App. at 337, 328 S.E.2d at 823.
129. 326 N.C. 205, 388 S.E.2d 134 (1990).
130. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 168A-1 to 12.
131. 326 N.C. at 210, 388 S.E.2d at 137. The Burgess opinion also states that the employment-at-will doctrine was only "narrowly eroded" by public policy considerations in Coman and
Sides. Id.
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claims to be grounded upon the public policy of the EEPA, courts
have ignored the second consideration identified by the supreme court
in Burgess, which is to maintain the scope of a statute within the
bounds intended by the legislature.
The weakness of the North Carolina Supreme Court's Amos decision, and the resulting use of that decision to expand the intended
scope of the EEPA, lies in its superficial treatment of the preclusive
effect of state legislation on the scope of the public policy exception to
the employment-at-will doctrine. The Amos opinion paid only lip service to the idea that legislative intent should govern the inquiry into
the preclusive effect of a state statute, by first examining the words of
the State Wage and Hour Act to determine "whether the state legislature intended to preclude common law actions."'132
Finding no express language precluding common law remedies, the
court next looked to "the purpose and spirit of the statute and what
the enactment sought to accomplish, considering both the history and
circumstances surrounding the legislation and the reason for its enactment.' 33 Because the State Wage and Hour Act was designed to provide employees with a vehicle to recover back wages while remaining
employed, and provided no remedy for employees who are discharged
for refusing to work for less than the statutory minimum wage, the
court found it unlikely that the legislature intended to supplant a common law
remedy for employees discharged in violation of public
34
policy.1
The Amos court found the "strongest" and "most obvious" argument against giving the State Wage and Hour Act preclusive effect
over a Coman public policy claim to be the fact that at the time the
statute was enacted, 35 neither the North Carolina Supreme Court nor
the court of appeals had recognized a public policy exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine.' s The court repeated the reasoning of
an Oregon Supreme Court decision: "It seems elementary that before
a legislative body can intend to eliminate1 37certain forms of remedy it
must be aware that such remedies exist."'
However, the logical corollary to the argument that a legislature
cannot intend to eliminate a remedy of which it was unaware is that a
legislature cannot intend, by declaring a public policy, to give rise to a
multitude of wrongful discharge claims that could not have been con132.
133.
134.
135.

Amos, 331 N.C. at 358, 416 S.E.2d at 172 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
1959 for N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-25.22 and 1979 for N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-25.20.

136. As discussed supra, the exception was first recognized by the court of appeals in 1985 in
Sides and by the supreme court in 1989 in Coman.
137. Amos, 331 N.C. at 359, 416 S.E.2d at 173.
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templated under the then existing state of the common law. Stated in
the terms used by the supreme court in Amos, it seems elementary
that before a legislative body can intend to give rise to wrongful discharge remedies, it must be aware that such remedies exist.
In the context of the EEPA, this means that the legislature's conscious rejection of a proposal to enact a state remedial scheme for
employment discrimination should not be interpreted as an inferred
legislative intent to create a remedy within the common law. Since
the enactment of the EEPA came at a time when the legislative act of
declaring a public policy against employment discrimination would
not give rise to a common law right of action, the legislative choice not
to provide a separate private enforcement mechanism should be
respected.
Of course, the vast majority of public policies were legislatively declared prior to the common law establishment of the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. Thus, an argument can be
made that a pure legislative intent approach would mean that no
wrongful discharge claims could be brought on the basis of public policies which predate Sides and Coman. However, there is a qualitative
difference between a wrongful discharge action based upon a public
policy regarding encouragement of truthful testimony in legal proceedings13 and an action based upon a public policy which declares
certain discharges to be discriminatory.139 The most important distinction between the two is that the legislature, in creating a public
policy in an area such as the encouragement of truthful testimony
which is only tangentially related to employment issues, cannot be assumed to have considered the question of a proper remedy for a
worker who is discharged in violation of that public policy. Where the
public policy directly involves issues of discriminatory discharge, considerable deference should be given to the legislative decision to
either create or not create a state law remedy that would essentially
parallel existing federal remedies. This is particularly true where, as
with the EEPA, the legislature had full knowledge of the existence of
a federal regulatory scheme for employment discrimination but had
no way of knowing that the mere declaration of a public policy without remedy would later serve to establish a state common law remedial scheme which the legislature had declined to enact by statute.
By expanding the availability of claims for wrongful discharge in
violation of the public policy of the EEPA beyond the relief intended
138. This was the public policy at issue in Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 335, 328 S.E.2d at 822, and
Williams, 91 N.C. App. at 39, 370 S.E.2d at 425.
139. E.g., age discrimination claims in McKinney, supra note 91, and sex discrimination in
Phillips supra note 92.

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1995

21

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 [1995], Art. 5

1995]

WRONGFUL DISCHARGE

by the legislature, North Carolina courts have turned away from the
holding of the court of appeals in Walker v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp.140 that it is up to the legislature to "strike the proper balance"
between an employer's right to operate the workplace and an141
employee's right not to be discharged in violation of public policy.
The North Carolina courts have similarly repudiated the reasoning
of Wehr v. Burroughs Corp.,142 which was cited with approval by the
court of appeals' decision in Amos. 43 In declining to recognize a separate breach of contract action for age discrimination in violation of
the public policy of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 1'" the
Wehr court observed:
It is clear then that the whole rationale undergirding the public policy
exception is the vindication or the protection of certain strong policies
of the community. If these strong policies or goals are preserved by
other remedies, then the public policy is sufficiently served. Therefore, application of the public policy exception requires two factors:
(1) that the discharge violate some well-established public policy; and
(2) that there be no remedy
to protect the interest of the aggrieved
45
employee or society.'
The courts in North Carolina that have held that the public policy
exception applies regardless of whether there is an alternative remedy
to protect the interest of the aggrieved employee or society have reasoned that the open courts clause of the North Carolina Constitution146 requires a state remedy for employment discrimination in
addition to federal statutory remedies. 47 However, the flaw in this
reasoning is the erroneous assumption that the open courts clause requires a state remedy (rather than a state forum) for every perceived
injury. The North Carolina Constitution speaks only of a state court
forum,'" that can be provided through the state's concurrent jurisdic140. 77 N.C. App. 253, 335 S.E.2d 79 (1985).
141. Id. at 263, 335 S.E.2d at 86.

142. 438 F. Supp. 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd as modified, 619 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1980).
143. 102 N.C. App. at 786, 403 S.E.2d at 568.
144. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. AN. §§ 951 et seq. (1991).
145. Wehr, 438 F. Supp. at 1055. See also Harrison,724 F. Supp. 1185, 1193 (M.D.N.C. 1989)
(holding that the North Carolina courts, if faced with the issue, would require the two factors
identified by Wehr for application of public policy exception); Frazier,747 F. Supp. at 1553 (citing Judge Gordon's Harrison opinion with approval).
146. N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 18, supra note 74.
147. See, e.g., Coman, 325 N.C. at 174, 381 S.E.2d at, 446 ("Although plaintiff may have some
additional remedy in the federal courts, the courts of North Carolina cannot fail to provide a
forum to determine a valid cause of action."); Harrison,924 F.2d at 533 (holding that in Coman
the existence of remedy in federal court was irrelevant since the open courts clause required a
state remedy).
148. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18, supra note 74.
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tion over Title VII actions. 149 The open courts clause can thus be satisfied by allowing federal statutory remedies to be pursued in the state
courts, without the need for a separate state common law remedy.
It is ironic that North Carolina's expansion of the tort of wrongful
discharge has come while other states have continued to apply the
public policy exception only where no other remedy is available to
protect the aggrieved employee from the offending conduct. 150 An indepth analysis of this issue was conducted by the Maryland Court of
Appeals in Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co.,151 a decision which ruled
that an employee could not state a claim for wrongful discharge in
violation of the public policy against sex discrimination where state
and federal remedies were available. The Makovi court held that
where the legislature had made, a choice concerning the manner in
which the public policy against discrimination should be enforced,
plaintiffs should not be permitted to "divorce the statutory remedy
from the goal and, in the name of achieving the goal, enlarge the rem149. Percell, 765 F. Supp. at 302 (holding that federal courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions brought under Title VII).
150. See Parlato v. Abbott Laboratories, 850 F.2d 203, 205 (4th Cir. 1988) (common law
claims in Maryland are preempted where a statutory remedy exists), aff'd, 886 F.2d 1429 (1989);
Spiller v. Ella Smithers Geriatric Center, 919 F.2d 339, 345 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Although public
policy has created some limited exceptions to the at-will employee doctrine [inTexas], wrongful
discharge because of race is not among them."); Wyrick v. TWA Credit Union, 804 F. Supp.
1176, 1182 (W.D. Mo. 1992) (no wrongful discharge action by employee who alleged that she
was discharged in violation of Title VII and Missouri Human Rights Act); Fellows v. Earth
Construction, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 531, 538 (D. Vt. 1992) (common law action for wrongful discharge in violation of the public policy against sex discrimination was precluded by the existence
of an adequate statutory remedy); Rupp v. Purolator Courier Corp., 790 F. Supp. 1069, 1072-73
(D. Kan. 1992) (Title VII and Kansas Act Against Discrimination provided exclusive remedies
for employee's claims); Kinnally v. Bell of Pennsylvania, 748 F. Supp. 1136, 1145-46 (E.D. Pa.
1990) (plaintiff may not appeal to the common law as an additional means of enforcing statutory
policy against workplace discrimination); Lapinad v. Pacific Oldsmobile-GMC, Inc., 679 F. Supp.
991, 993 (D. Haw. 1988) (no wrongful discharge claim for alleged sex discrimination where state
and federal remedies already protected the public interest at stake); Treadwell v. John Hancock
Mutual Life Insurance Co., 666 F. Supp. 278, 281 (D. Mass. 1987) (employee claiming wrongful
termination on grounds of age discrimination has no cause of action separate from the already
established comprehensive statutory remedial scheme); Salazar v. Furr's, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 1403,
1408 (D.N.M. 1986) (no wrongful discharge on sex discrimination grounds because of an available statutory remedy under Title VII and its state counterpart); Ring v. R.J. Reynolds Industries, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 1277, 1280-81 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (no cause of action exists in Illinois for
wrongful discharge in violation of the public policy contained in the Illinois Human Rights Act);
Shanahan v. WITI-TV, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 219, 224-25 (E.D. Wisc. 1982) (no wrongful discharge
claim where ADEA and state statute adequately serve to promote the state's policy against age
discrimination); Dockins v. Ingles Markets, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 18, 19 (S.C. 1992) (wrongful discharge plaintiff limited to statutory remedy). But see Katzer v. Baldor Electric Co., 969 F.2d 935,
937-39 (10th Cir. 1992) (employee's allegation of handicap motivated discharge fell within
Oklahoma's public policy exception to at-will employment even though administrative remedies
existed); Lockhart v. Commonwealth Education Systems Corp., 439 S.E.2d 328 (Va. 1994) (public policy against race and sex discrimination can be the basis for wrongful discharge claims).
151. 561 A.2d 179 (Md. 1989). The reasoning of Makovi was endorsed by the Fourth Circuit
in Parlato v. Abbott Laboratories,886 F.2d at 1429-30.
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edy for a statutory violation."'
The court stated further that the
remedies chosen by the legislature "form part of the anti-discrimination policy," thus the public policy goal should not be considered in
isolation from the legislative remedy.' 5 3 To do otherwise would upset
"the balance between right and remedy struck by the Legislature in
establishing the very policy relied upon."' 5 4
Allowing wrongful discharge claims based on the EEPA could also
interfere with the administrative investigation and conciliation conducted by the EEOC in response to charges brought pursuant to Title
VII, the ADEA, and the ADA. By asserting claims for wrongful discharge in violation of the public policy of the EEPA, alleged victims of
discrimination will be allowed to file suit directly in state court without first exhausting the administrative remedies procedures mandated under those federal statutes. Thus, the important role played by
the EEOC in initially reviewing all charges made under federal antidiscrimination statutes and the strict time limits mandated by Congress 55 will be removed in cases where plaintiffs choose to proceed
directly with state wrongful discharge actions.
CONCLUSION

When the EEPA was enacted in 1977, the state legislature considered and rejected a proposal that would have made employment discrimination litigation the subject of state law. The final bill as passed
omitted the broad prohibitions and enforcement mechanisms originally proposed, and instead simply declared that it was the public policy of North Carolina to promote equal employment opportunity
without discrimination on account of race, religion, color, national origin, age, sex, or handicap. With the development of public policy
wrongful discharge claims based on Coman and Amos, the state and
federal courts in North Carolina have undone the legislative compromise that sought to have employment discrimination litigation proceed within the existing federal statutory framework.
While the federal courts in North Carolina now appear to view the
availability of wrongful discharge suits based on the public policy of
the EEPA as a matter of settled law, a number of federal judges have
expressed their dismay at this expansion of state wrongful discharge
claims. Because neither the North Carolina Court of Appeals nor the
152. Id.at 609, 561 A.2d at 182.

153. Id. at 621-23, 561 A.2d at 188-89.
154. Id. at 626, 561 A.2d at 190.
155. See, e.g., Smith v.Sentry Insurance Co., 674 F. Supp. 1459,1467 (N.D. Ga. 1987) ("[T]he
investigatory function of the EEOC lies at the heart of the statutory scheme for remedying
discrimination made illegal by the ADEA and Title VII.").
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North Carolina Supreme Court has addressed the question of whether
the EEPA can be the basis for a public policy wrongful discharge
claim, it remains possible that the state courts will rule that the EEPA
was never intended to be used in such a manner. Alternatively, the
state legislature could clarify its intent in enacting the EEPA by declaring that the public policy of the EEPA should not be the basis of
state common law claims which parallel federal statutory claims. At
this point, further guidance from the courts or the legislature is required to reassert the legislature's original intent to maintain the federal statutory scheme as the primary means of preventing employment
discrimination.
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